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ABSTRACT

Demographic and economic trends that will influence higher education and the implications for collective bargaining and forced faculty unionism are considered. Section II presents enrollment and cost data for the period 1965-1985, which determine the demand for instructional staff at colleges and universities; data are also provided on the supply of potential academicians for both public and private institutions. Declining enrollment figures and reduced tuition revenues imply decreased demand for faculty at the same time that the supply of academic professionals is increasing. This will cause growing faculty concern about job security and compensation, which is likely to create increasing pressures for collective bargaining as an alternative to the faculty tenure system. In Section III, an historical perspective is given of the growth and performance of collective bargaining in higher education. It is argued that all previous studies on academic unions contain substantial biases that favor unionism because the costs associated with union organizing, membership and bargaining have been ignored. It is concluded that collective bargaining in general, and forced unionism in particular, will not give individual professors the higher pay and job security they are seeking. Academic unions may also create additional bureaucracies and red tape, alter the traditional relationships between faculty and administration, and weaken the faculty's role in institutional decision-making. A short list of references is appended. (DC)

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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND FORCED UNIONISM?

JAMES T. BENNETT
and
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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND FORCED UNIONISM?

James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson

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I. Introduction

Higher education in the United States experienced an unprecedented period of growth and financial stability during the 1960s, which continued, although at a slower rate, through much of the 1970s. In contrast to this era of relative affluence, the next decade portends a prolonged period of financial exigency and physical retrenchment due to declining enrollments and other economic factors. This paper explores the demographic and economic trends which will shape the development of institutions of higher education and the implications for collective bargaining and forced unionism of faculties.

Section II presents enrollment and cost data for the period 1965-1985 which determine the demand for instructional staff at colleges and universities; data are provided also on the supply of potential academicians. Declining enrollments and tuition revenue imply decreased demand for faculty at the same time that the supply of academic hopefuls is increasing. This will cause growing faculty concern about job security and compensation, which is likely to create increasing pressures for collective bargaining as an alternative to the traditional form of job security. In Section III, an historical perspective is given of the growth and performance of collective bargaining in higher education. Studies of faculty unions indicate that, even in periods of economic prosperity, collective bargaining has not raised the compensation of unionized faculty relative to nonunionized counterparts. It is shown also that all previous studies contain substantial biases which favor unionism, because, without exception, the costs associated with union membership and bargaining have been ignored. Because these costs may be substantial, the net benefits are overstated. In the last section, a summary indicates that collective bargaining in general, and forced unionism in particular, will infringe on academic freedom, for union security agreements restrict and dilute options of individual professors.

II. The Future of Higher Education: Economic and Demographic Trends

Understanding of the dramatic changes which will occur over the next decade in higher education is enhanced by a brief historical perspective of developments during the 1960s.

Two factors are chiefly responsible for the prolonged prosperity enjoyed by both public and private colleges and universities during the 1960s: the increased enrollments of the post-World War II "baby boom" population and the "race for space" triggered by the launching of the first Soviet satellite. The tremendous growth in enrollments resulted in

a shortage of space and facilities available for incoming students. Faced with an oversupply of students, private institutions were able to finance expansions in physical facilities and operations by increasing tuition. Among public institutions, the increased demand for education was financed through larger appropriations, because public spending for higher education is generally tied to the number of "full-time-equivalent" students.

The federal government, spurred by Sputnik and a 1955 National Education Association report forecasting a serious shortage of scientists and teachers, also contributed to the rapid growth in post-secondary education by rapidly escalating education funding. During the 1960s, federal research funds to colleges and universities increased by 370 percent, while appropriations for the construction of graduate education facilities reached almost a quarter of a billion dollars. Federal support for graduate fellowships and traineeships rose from $159.5 million in 1970 to $896.0 million in 1970 — more than 460 percent. By 1965, about 60 percent of all American graduate students received some type of federal government support.[1]

The growth in enrollments created a large demand for qualified faculty, who, because of the lags between matriculation and graduation in obtaining advanced degrees, were in short supply. Between 1965 and 1970, total full-time-equivalent faculty increased almost 43 percent, from 316 thousand to 461 thousand. Their compensation also rose substantially as colleges and universities sought to attract or retain qualified instructional and research staff. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, higher education flourished as a major growth industry.

This era of prosperity and growth, however, has come to an end, for two major reasons. First, enrollments are pro-

[1] For a more detailed treatment of federal funding to higher education, see U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Projection of Education Statistics to 1985-86*, pp. 140-146.

jected to decline, and will be accompanied by a decline in the number of instructional faculty. Second, although the demand for teaching faculty is declining, the supply of Ph.D.s and other academic job-seekers is forecast to increase.

These demographic trends have significant economic implications both for institutions of higher education and for the job security and status of academic professionals.

Table 1
Estimates of Higher Education Enrollments in the U.S. by Academic Year, 1965-1985
(in thousands)

Year	Higher Education[a]		
	Private	Public	Total
1965	1,577	3,094	4,671
1966	1,672	3,394	5,070
1967	1,719	3,761	5,480
1968	1,726	4,228	5,954
1969	1,755	4,564	6,319
1970	1,783	4,937	6,721
1971	1,785	5,218	7,003
1972	1,801	5,454	7,255
1973	1,824	5,630	7,454
1974	1,861	5,945	7,806
1975	1,958	6,523	8,481
1976	1,988	6,813	8,801
1977	2,009	7,070	9,079
1978	2,022	7,311	9,333
1979	2,025	7,499	9,524
1980	2,020	7,670	9,690
1981	2,012	7,812	9,824
1982	1,990	7,893	9,883
1983	1,954	7,886	9,840
1984	1,901	7,810	9,711
1985	1,846	7,700	9,546

[a]Full-time equivalent enrollment.

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education Division, National Center for Education Statistics, *Projection of Education Statistics to 1985-1986* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 20.

A. *The Demand For Higher Education*

As shown in Table 1, full-time-equivalent enrollments in higher education peaks in 1979 for private colleges and universities and three years later, in 1982, for public institutions. In the private sector, a decline of 8.8 percent is projected over the seven year period 1979-1985; in the same period, the total number enrolled in public higher education actually increases by 2.7 percent, although the 7.7 million figure for private institutions will be impacted by declining enrollments not only earlier in time, but also more severely than public institutions.

As enrollments decline, many private institutions will experience a reduction in tuition revenue which will not be offset by declines in costs. For universities, costs are incurred predominantly for the operation of physical plant and for staff salaries, both relatively fixed in the short-run. In order to maintain financial stability, tuition and fees charged by private institutions must increase relative to these charges at public institutions. Public institutions, because of state subsidies to higher education, are not as dependent as nonpublic colleges and universities on tuition revenue. This scenario is consistent with the projections shown in Table 2.

Tuition and required fees at institutions of higher education for 1965-1985, in constant 1975-1976 dollars, are displayed in Table 2. Over the entire period, the real tuition and required fees at public institutions increase by 46.3 percent, while tuition and fees at nonpublic colleges and universities increase by only 41.7 percent. However, the large percentage increase in public tuition is associated with the small absolute value in 1965. In absolute terms, the real cost of tuition at a public facility increases by only $263 over the 21 year period: in absolute terms, nonpublic tuition and fees increase by almost a thousand dollars. The difference between tuition and fees at public and private schools (fourth column) is not only large in absolute terms, but also growing over time. For example, from 1965 to 1985, the difference in

constant dollars increases by more than 40.0 percent, and, between 1979 (when enrollments at nonpublic institutions of higher education reach their peak) and 1985, the difference is projected to increase by 11.3 percent. Further, because room and board also are often subsidized at public institutions, the student attending college away from home will find a large and growing differential in such charges. From a financial perspective, public higher education will become more attractive relative to nonpublic higher education.[2]

Because public colleges and universities will have a growing advantage over nonpublic institutions, a shift will occur in enrollments from the private to the public sector. Those colleges and universities which are most dependent on tuition revenue from income and which must increase tuition most will generally be the hardest hit by declining enrollments. Nonpublic institutions with substantial endowment income or support from other sources, *e.g.*, foundation funding or religious group backing, may be relatively insulated from the financial impact of declining enrollments. The typical nonpublic institution most severely affected probably will be small and poorly endowed. The foregoing, however, does not imply that public institutions of higher education will be entirely insulated by state tax revenues from the declines in enrollments forecast to begin in 1982. Since the funding of public education has traditionally been tied to full-time-equivalent enrollments, as these decline, so will the funding unless alterations occur in funding formulas.

In view of the demographic trends indicating declining college enrollments and the financial difficulties which will be created for both private and public institutions, cost-cutting measures can be anticipated. College and university administrators will be forced to evaluate carefully the economic viability of various graduate and undergraduate

[2] A complete discussion of the effect of tuition costs and other economic factors on the decision to attend college can be found in Kohn, Manski, and Mundel (1976).

programs. In essence, the reduction in enrollments in higher education will translate directly into a reduction in demand for institutional staff. Table 3 provides data on the instructional staff required at institutions of higher education from 1970 to 1985.

Table 2
Estimated Average Tuition and Fees at Public and Nonpublic Institutions of Higher Education in the U.S. by Academic Year, 1965-1985 (in constant 1975-1976 dollars)

Year	Tuition and Required Fees		
	Public	Nonpublic	Difference
1965	$ 568	$ 2,387	$ 1,819
1966	607	2,453	1,846
1967	597	2,501	1,904
1968	586	2,548	1,962
1969	627	2,657	2,030
1970	668	2,766	2,098
1971	709	2,875	2,166
1972	733	2,884	2,151
1973	691	2,825	2,134
1974	639	2,714	2,075
1975	656	2,775	2,119
1976	674	2,836	2,162
1977	691	2,896	2,205
1978	709	2,957	2,248
1979	726	3,018	2,292
1980	744	3,079	2,335
1981	761	3,140	2,379
1982	778	3,200	2,422
1983	796	3,261	2,465
1984	813	3,322	2,509
1985	831	3,383	2,552

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education Division, National Center for Education Statistics, *Projection of Education Statistics to 1985-1986* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 84-85.

During the 1970s, instructional staff at colleges and universities rose by nearly 25 percent from 451 thousand to 556 thousand. Even more dramatic increases were experienced

during the decade of the 1960s. The number of additional faculty required for replacements (due to death, retirement, and attrition from teaching) increased slowly, but steadily, in the 1970s from 27 to 33 thousand, or by 22 percent. The remainder of the increase during these years was needed to meet increased enrollment; in 1975, for example, 36 thousand additional faculty were required to provide instructional services. Increasing demand for academicians, particularly in the 1960s, resulted in substantial salary gains for academic professionals relative to other professionals.

As shown in the last column of Table 3, the total number of additional instructional staff required reaches a maximum of 65 thousand in 1975 and declines steadily thereafter. The numbers required for replacement level out at about 33 to 34 thousand after 1978: the number required to meet enrollment changes peaks in 1975 and becomes negative after 1982. Over the three-year period 1983-1985, 31 thousand teaching positions will be eliminated because of the projected drop in enrollment and projected increases in average class size. From Tables 1 and 3, the average enrollment per teacher increases from 14.9 in 1970 to 17.9 in 1985 — more than 20 percent. The projections of instructional staff requirements shown in Table 3 were developed prior to the passage of Age Discrimination Act of 1978, which may permit faculty to remain active in teaching for longer periods of time, because retirement at age 65 may be no longer required. To the extent faculty continue to teach beyond age 65, the estimates of the number of additional instructional staff needed for replacement are overstated.

In sum, declining enrollments in the years ahead will produce a decline in the demand for instructional staff at both public and private universities. Academicians currently associated with higher education will find diminished opportunities for employment and for increases in pay. The economic problems faced by academics will be exacerbated by potential competition from an increasing supply of academic job-seekers.

B. *The Supply of Academic Job Seekers*

The outlook for academic jobs can be described as gloomy at best. Table 4, on the output of doctorates, suggests that the supply of potential academicians far exceeds any reasonable estimate of the demand. It is difficult to specify the supply of job seekers, because not all holders of the doctorate pursue academic careers, community colleges often hire individuals with intermediate degrees, and individuals in other careers teach on a part-time basis.

Table 3
Full-Time-Equivalent Instructional Staff at U.S. Institutions of Higher Education by Source of Change and by Academic Year, 1970-1985
(in thousands)

Year	Instructional Staff	Additional Instructional Staff Required		
		For Replacement	To meet Enrollment Changes	Required Total
1970	451	27	7	34
1971	458	27	7	34
1972	455	27	—3	24
1973	462	27	7	34
1974	479	28	17	45
1975	515	29	36	65
1976	528	31	13	44
1977	540	32	12	44
1978	550	32	10	42
1979	556	33	6	39
1980	561	33	5	38
1981	563	34	2	36
1982	563	34	0	34
1983	556	34	—7	27
1984	545	33	—11	22
1985	532	33	—13	20

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education Division, National Center for Education Statistics, *Projection of Education Statistics to 1985-1986* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 57.

In response to the accelerated demand for college and university faculty in the early 1960s, graduate enrollments

soared, as did the production of advanced degrees. From 1960 to 1970, 184 thousand doctorates were awarded, more than in all previous years combine. As shown in Table 4, the output of earned doctorates is projected to increase through academic year 1985-1986.[3] Between 1965 and 1975, the output of earned doctorates more than doubled on an annual basis, and between 1975 and 1985, the number of doctorates awarded annually increases by an additional 20 percent. The annual output of doctorates in the social sciences increases nearly 2.5 times between 1964 and 1985; comparable figures for the humanities and the natural sciences increase by 1.42 and 1.37 times, respectively. Although the data are not shown, the annual output of earned Master's degrees has increased at least as rapidly as that of doctoral degrees.

There is, then, a large oversupply of job seekers in the academic marketplace which is rapidly growing. This oversupply is not evenly distributed across disciplines, the glut being more serious in some fields, *e.g.*, history and languages, than in others. As declines in enrollments continue, however, one can expect the oversupply to affect virtually all disciplines, with possible exceptions of certain highly specialized fields.

C. *Implications of Demographic Trends for Faculty Job Security and Economic Status*

As enrollments and faculty requirements in public and private institutions of higher education are rapidly declining, the output of academic job seekers is rapidly increasing. These two together foreshadow serious difficulties for institutions of higher education and their faculties. The major concerns of faculty members will relate to financial status and job security.

[3] Braddock (1978) reports that the total number of projected openings for Ph.D.s created by growth and replacement requirements are 192.8 thousand over the 1976-1985 period. However, over the same period, 323.0 thousand new Ph D.s are expected to enter the Ph.D. labor market, indicating an excess supply of 130.2 thousand, or 40.3 percent.

Table 4
Earned Doctoral Degrees in the U.S. by Field of Study and by Academic Year, 1964-1965 to 1985-1986

Year	Total	Social Sciences	Humanities	Natural Sciences and Miscellaneous
1964–65	16,467	2,776	1,848	11,843
1965–66	18,237	3,129	2,061	13,047
1966–67	20,617	3,641	2,362	14,614
1967–68	23,089	4,004	2,779	16,306
1968–69	26,188	4,599	3,124	18,465
1969–70	29,866	5,383	3,476	21,007
1970–71	32,107	5,802	3,999	22,306
1971–72	33,363	6,389	4,163	22,811
1972–73	34,777	6,640	4,558	23,579
1973–74	33,816	6,752	4,385	22,679
1974–75	34,083	6,992	4,238	22,853
1975–76	35,000	7,700	4,270	23,030
1976–77	37,000	8,420	4,450	24,130
1977–78	37,000	8,390	4,340	24,270
1978–79	36,000	8,100	4,150	23,750
1979–80	36,000	8,130	4,150	23,720
1980–81	37,000	8,350	4,260	24,390
1981–82	39,000	8,620	4,460	25,920
1982–83	40,000	8,890	4,440	26,670
1983–84	41,000	9,160	4,510	27,330
1984–85	42,000	9,440	4,590	27,970
1985–86	42,000	9,470	4,480	28,050

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education Division, National Center for Education Statistics, *Projection of Education Statistics to 1985-1986* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 39.

Declining enrollments and escalating costs due to inflation have produced retrenchment and calls for accountability by university administrators and legislatures. New regulations, cost-cutting efforts, and increased demands on faculty productivity have contributed to growing conflict between institutional managers and faculty. The pressure from legislatures, state coordinating agencies, and boards of trustees for expenditure cuts and accountability has accelerated the adoption of new management techniques for colleges and

universities. The primary approach to improving institutional quality in the past was to attract better-qualified faculty by offering higher salaries, more perquisites, and lower teaching loads; in the future, administrators are likely to rely on better control, planning, performance evaluation, and the reallocation of more limited resources to maintain institutional strengths in the presence of greater fiscal constraints.

From the perspective of college and university administrators, the principal impediment to the implementation of modern management methods is the tenure system. The expansion of higher education in the 1960s has produced a large number of tenured faculty in their forties. In 1972, 42 percent of all full-time faculty were 40 or younger, and only 22 percent were between 50 and 70; by 1990, however, less than 24 percent of the faculty will be 40 or younger, while those between 50 and 70 will exceed 50 percent. Further, when the upper permissible mandatory retirement age for professors is raised to 70 in 1982, the system may become less flexible and the faculty even older. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish required cutbacks through normal attrition.

Although tenure has for decades been a highly effective guarantee of job security, adjustments required by declining enrollments will in due course lead to the dismissal of tenured faculty, at least at some institutions.[4] Even now, some graduate programs have been eliminated by the Board of Regents in New York state and at state schools in Louisiana. Thus, the traditional form of job security will no longer provide assurance of academic employment.

Further, college administrators, in an attempt to cut costs and to reduce inflexibilities created by the tenure system, will increasingly turn to part-time faculty: in some community colleges, part-time staff already handle as much as

[4] According to Schramm (1975), as early as 1973 over 400 college and university faculty filed complaints concerning tenure denials or dismissal despite tenure as a result of decreasing enrollments.

50 percent of the teaching. Such part-time faculty are generally paid much less and therefore offer an attractive alternative to more costly, tenured faculty. One of the few options open to administrators to encourage tenured faculty to leave the institution of their own accord is to make it financially attractive to do so by severely limiting salary increases while offering marginally enhanced retirement options. When older faculty leave, they can be replaced either with the ample supply of young job entrants, hired at much lower salaries, or by part-time staff. Such a course of action accomplishes reductions in (1) the inflexibility of the tenure system and (2) instructional costs. If for no other reason, declining tuition income may make salary increases minimal in any case. One thing is clear: the demographic trends of declining enrollments and the large oversupply of prospective academicians who are willing to work if jobs were available, even at relatively low salaries, will result in an erosion of the economic status of faculty in higher education.

When it is perceived by academicians that the existing institutional arrangements no longer provide job or economic security, it is to be expected that alternatives will be sought. It may appear that the most promising alternative is the collective bargaining model employed principally in the industrial sector.

III. Collective Bargaining In Higher Education: An Overview and Critical Assessment

Given the uncertainties regarding tenure and economic security which are now present and will become increasingly important in the future, it is natural for academicians to seek support from sources outside the university. Collective bargaining is not the only alternative, for there are also the courts and national as well as local professional associations. However, neither professional organizations nor the courts have been effective in protecting job and economic security. It is, therefore, possible that unionism may be widely adopted.

A. *Professional Associations: National and Local*

One weapon of academicians in dealing with administrators and even legislators to achieve academic objectives has been the threat of withholding their services. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the oldest and most prestigious professional organization for academicians, would place on its "censured" list those institutions deemed to have violated professional standards. This action was intended to discourage professionals from taking appointments at censured institutions, thereby forcing the administration or the legislature to correct the violations, and to discourage other institutions from engaging in similar activities. However, when a large number of job candidates stand ready to accept any academic opening, the threat of withholding labor services has been ineffective.

At the local level, the effectiveness of professional associations, such as local AAUP chapters, is severely restricted. These organizations have only limited access to internal campus governance processes, and they have no legal status to influence internal decisions. In addition, as mentioned above, in times of economic adversity, the types of sanctions (*e.g.*, censure) available to them have only modest impact in times of economic adversity. Similarly, campus faculty associations not supported by collective bargaining agreements are almost powerless to secure benefits for their members.[5] It is possible for campus-based organizations to negotiate collectively a contract without a certified bargaining agent; however, these negotiations lack the enforcement powers of the state and are, therefore, usually quite ineffective.

B. *The Courts*

The increasing extension of court authority into the internal workings of both public and private colleges and univer-

[5] For example, in 1970 the faculty of the University of Scranton established an informal bargaining arrangement with the university administration. However, the informal nature of the agreement caused negotiations to collapse in 1974, and the administration pursued contracts with individual faculty members.

sities has generated considerable debate. One argument is that intervention by external agencies into internal affairs destroys campus self-governance and undermines the essential autonomy of the professional staff. Courts have generally examined only procedural issues, normally avoiding delicate substantive issues involving peer judgment. The courts, for example, have been willing to judge when tenure review processes have been fair but have avoided judging the merits and criteria used by a tenure committee. Some faculty, skeptical of court participation, look instead to formal collective bargaining, despite the irony that unionism may involve no less external intrusion by an unqualified agency than before in issues of peer judgement the courts have avoided.

C. *Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: Historical Perspective*

Unionism began to make significant inroads into academia in the late 1960s, when collective bargaining contracts were first enforced at major colleges and universities. Since that time, 480 out of some 2,400 institutions of higher education have voted to unionize.[6] These institutions represent 133 thousand of the 540 thousand total faculty members, or 25 percent.[7] Most recent statistics, however, indicate that the rapid growth of unionism in higher education in the late 1960s and early 1970s will not continue, even if the conditions of that period remain the same, since most of the academicians desiring collective bargaining arrangements have already been brought into the fold, primarily faculty at community colleges.

Table 5 indicates the number of unionized institutions of higher education by year and by type of institution for the period, 1966 to 1977. Over the entire period, the total num-

[6] See Means and Semas, eds., *A Chronicle of Higher Education Handbook: Faculty Collective Bargaining*, p. vi.

[7] These data are the most recent available and are reported by Garbarino (1978). Information of this type is published annually by Garbarino in the February issue of *Industrial Relations*.

ber of unionized four-year and other institutions increased steadily. The year-to-year percentage change, however, has declined substantially since the late 1960s, as the base on which the percentages are computed has risen.[8] These data, however, are for periods prior to the onset of declining enrollments. Throughout most of the 1966-1977 period, enrollments continued to increase at fairly steady rates (see Table 1), so the financial difficulties expected in the future have not been experienced on a wide scale.

Table 5
Four-Year and Other Institutions of Higher Education with Faculty Unions and the Year-to-Year Percentage Change, 1966-1977

Year	Four Year Institutions	Year-to-Year % Change	All Other Institutions	Year-to-Year % Change
1966	1	—	22	—
1967	2	100	35	60
1968	10	500	60	71
1969	26	160	112	87
1970	40	53	137	22
1971	84	110	161	18
1972	102	21	183	14
1973	121	18	189	3
1974	132	9	206	9
1975	158	20	236	15
1976	189	20	261	11
1977	196	4	284	14

Source: Joseph W. Garbarino, "Faculty Union Activity in Higher Education," *Industrial Relations*, various years.

Ladd and Lipset (1973), Kemerer and Baldridge (1975), and others have shown that faculty at private colleges and universities have been less sympathetic toward unionization than their cohorts at public institutions. However, these surveys were conducted in relatively prosperous economic periods, and do not capture the anxiety created by the threat of degree program cutbacks and the elimination of both ten-

[8] See Schramm (1975, p. 726).

ured and nontenured positions. As enrollments decline, small, private, poorly endowed colleges which lack either state or church support will begin to cancel programs, thus causing unemployment of some faculty. Professors in similar institutions will see colleagues dismissed from schools which have been caught in the vise of rising costs and declining tuition revenues. Their plight will serve as a reminder that such traditional job protection mechanisms as tenure may not be adequate and that new mechanisms must therefore be found. Unions, in the past, have been quick to exploit opportunities far less attractive.

In a survey of *nonunion* institutions, Kemerer and Baldridge (1973, p. 40) report that the three most important reasons which would cause the faculty respondents to support a union are: fear of budget cuts, fear of a teacher surplus, and the consequent desire for enhanced job security. A similar survey of faculty at *all* types of institutions indicates that the primary reason given for joining a union was the desire for higher wages and benefits. In general, these surveys indicate that economic and job security are the major concerns of faculty. It is important to consider whether faculty unionization has been successful. If unions have been unable to raise compensation of unionized relative to nonunionized faculties in prosperous periods, it is doubtful they could do so in periods of financial stress. There is little evidence available on the performance of unions in higher education with regard to job security, because large-scale reductions in instructional staff have not yet occurred.

If collective bargaining becomes widespread, unions may exert considerable political power to increase financial support, especially for public institutions. The experience of elementary and high school teachers, who do exert substantial strength through state education associations as well as through national organizations, suggests that political influence alone is not adequate to prevent school closings and teacher layoffs. In any case, political influence may have little impact on the plight of private institutions.

D. *Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: Success or Failure?*

Most studies of the impact of academic unions have focused on contrasting faculty compensation at union campuses with that of "comparable" nonunion campuses. While faculty compensation alone is not a complete measure of union impact, it is the most conspicuous and the most susceptible to empirical investigation.

Table 6 summarizes five studies which have examined the impact of academic unions on faculty compensation. Overall, these studies cover more than a decade and include a large number of campuses in the analyses. Faculty at unionized institutions are reported to receive a higher annual compensation in four cases; yet, in only one instance does this differential exceed one thousand dollars. In the three other such cases, the differential is considerably smaller — in fact, as low as $47 per year. Two investigators find no significant difference in compensation levels, and Garbarino's research indicates that, in two different time periods, nonunion faculty at community colleges fared better than their unionized counterparts. In sum, based on the information shown in Table 6, there is no convincing evidence that unions have raised relative compensation levels in higher education. Although beyond the scope of this discussion, Alan Balfour (1974, p. 301) has drawn similar conclusions about the effects of unions on the salaries of high school teachers, *viz.*, " . . . the presence of teacher unionism did not play a significant role in the differences in average salaries of teachers . . . and, specifically, did not raise teachers' salaries."

There are important biases in all the studies summarized in Table 6. Brown and Stone (1977a) charge that faulty methods were used in both the Birnbaum and the Morgan and Kearney studies to match union with nonunion institutions in an attempt to control for nonunion effects. Birnbaum and Morgan and Kearney used the same observation period and the same matching methodology in their respective

studies, yet, of the twenty-two collective bargaining campuses common to both samples, only one was matched with the same nonunion institution. With regard to the problem of matching unionized and nonunionized institutions, Brown and Stone note that

> the researcher is forced to choose the "best" match. It is this necessity to trade off between conflicting criteria that produces the subjectivity in judgment inherent in the process of matching. Consequently, results will depend critically on the nature of the "matching bias" (1977a, pp. 77).

Table 6
A Summary of Studies Estimating the Extent of Union Faculty Compensation Advantage Over Nonunion Faculty

Empirical Study	Type of Sample	Union Minus Nonunion Annual Compensation
R. Birnbaum (1974)	88 matched union and nonunion campuses for the academic years 1968–69 and 1972–73	+ $47 (1968–69) + $824 (1972–73)
J. Garbarino (1975)	matched union and nonunion community colleges for academic years 1965–66 and 1972–73	— $682 (1965–66) — $404 (1972–73)
R. Birnbaum (1976)	70 matched union and nonunion campuses for academic year 1974–75	+ $1,144 (1974–75)
Brown and Stone (1976)	compare 32 union campuses with national averages from academic year 1972–73 to 1975–76	No significant difference
Morgan and Kearney (1977)	46 matched union and nonunion campuses for academic years 1969–70 and 1974–75	No significant difference (1969–70) + $625 (1974–75)

After an extensive review and critique of existing studies of union relative to nonunion faculty compensation at institutions of higher education,[9] Brown and Stone (1977a, p. 86) conclude that

> there would appear to be no strong evidence in the Birnbaum and Morgan/Kearney studies that gains in faculty compensation are uniquely associated with the adoption of collective bargaining by college and university faculty. This is consistent with the Brown/Stone findings which directly show that unionization has not been associated with increases in faculty compensation levels. While this does not prove that unions have no effects, it does suggest that there is simply no convincing evidence that faculty collective bargaining has generally affected faculty compensation.

Two further points also are highly significant. First, the data for all these studies apply to time periods prior to the onset of declining enrollments at either private or public institutions. Even if the evidence from historical data were interpreted to show that collective bargaining led to relative compensation gains in the past, there is no basis for projecting such gains into the future during periods of financial difficulties resulting from declining enrollments. Second, none of the studies, including the work of Brown and Stone, takes into account the fact that collective bargaining is not a costless activity. Relative compensation gains by unionized faculty, if any, must be adjusted downward to incorporate dues, fees, fines, and assessments paid to the union, as well as any income foregone due to strikes. If this were done, any positive union/nonunion compensation differences would be smaller.

In sum, there is no convincing evidence that collective bargaining has produced relative gains for college faculty during periods of enrollment growth and relative financial stability; certainly, there is no reason to expect this state of

[9] Brown and Stone (1977, pp. 78-81) also find fault with the Birnbaum and the Morgan and Kearney studies for failing to correct for market adjustment lags, institutional quality differentials, and ambiguity of estimates due to timing problems.

affairs to change during a period of declining demand and financial retrenchment.

IV. Summary and Implications for Higher Education

During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, colleges and universities in the United States experienced rapid growth in enrollments and in federal government funding. According to government projections, the period of growth in higher education is ending, and, throughout the 1980s, enrollments will decline sharply. These projections indicate that higher education will experience financial difficulties so severe that many institutions — especially small, private, poorly endowed colleges — will be forced to close. Many aspiring academicians will not be able to obtain teaching positions, and, as institutions close, many currently employed in higher education are likely to find their appointments terminated.

Under such conditions, the traditional form of job security, tenure, may not be effective. Alternative arrangements may be sought to provide job and economic security for faculty. Historically, professional associations such as the AAUP have tried to protect academicians from abuses of academic freedom and termination without due process by the threat of "censure," which essentially implied the withholding of labor services. However, such threats are made virtually meaningless by declining enrollments, a reduction in demand for instructional staff, and a rapidly increasing supply of academic job seekers.

Collective bargaining may appeal to faculty as a means of improving their economic status and job protection; its establishment in higher education occurred during a period of relative economic prosperity, and it is likely to become even more prevalent when retrenchment begins. Objective research, however, has so far been unable to document the claims made on behalf of academic unionism under the best of circumstances: as these circumstances steadily worsen, it seems evident that the psychological pressures on faculty to unionize may have even less economic substance.

One of the major benefits presumably to be expected from collective bargaining is that unionized faculty should receive *higher compensation* than their nonunion counterparts.[10] There is, however, no settled evidence that unions in the past have succeeded in raising relative compensation, even in periods of increasing enrollments. All earlier studies of union/nonunion compensation differentials are seriously flawed in that they do not take into account the dues, fines, fees, and assessments which members must pay from their income. In addition, the principal weapon employed by the union to obtain its demands is the strike, and none of the earlier studies adjusts for the income foregone by faculty at unionized institutions during strikes. These omissions create a substantial bias in favor of the relative advantage of unionized faculties. Given opposite and contradictory conclusions regarding the success of unions in enhancing the economic status of their members relative to nonmembers even in periods of economic prosperity, the proposition that collective bargaining can achieve widespread economic gains when financial difficulties arise must be seen as highly dubious.

In the public sector, unions may attempt to exert political pressure to achieve compensation gains and protect the jobs of their members. This activity, even if successful to some degree, is unlikely to benefit substantially faculty at private institutions. Moreover, though primary and secondary school

[10] One might argue that unionized campuses have been primarily those threatened early with financial exigency, and, therefore, union success should be measured by the extent to which the exigency has been blunted. Thus, one might observe a zero or even a negative union/nonunion compensation differential and still assert that the union has been successful because the faculty at the unionized campuses *would* have done much worse *without* the union. However, many of the universities with collective bargaining have faculty compensation levels that historically have been among the highest in the nation, *e.g.*, City University of New York (12 campuses), State University of New York (24 campuses), State University of Florida (9 campuses), University of Connecticut (6 campuses), and the University of the District of Columbia, which has the highest average faculty compensation levels in the nation. Moreover, Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) and Schmidt and Strauss (1976) have shown that industrial unions tend to organize high-wage rather than low-wage industries and firms; a similar argument seems appropriate for unions in higher education.

teachers are highly organized for political purposes through national, state, and local organizations, and though mandatory attendance laws have produced less severe reductions in primary/secondary school enrollments, these more politicized, more unionized, and less severely affected educational levels have nonetheless experienced numerous school closings, rising unemployment, and no apparent economic benefits attributable to being so highly unionized (see Balfour, 1974). Neither economic action by their unions nor political action by their unions' lobbies has enabled primary and secondary school teachers to nullify the hard realities of the demographic, financial, and institutional trends of their profession. It seems unrealistic to believe higher education faculty would be more successful in similar attempts to repeal the laws of economics.

A second major benefit which might be expected from collective bargaining is *job security*. Little evidence is available on a union's ability to protect a member's employment: in higher education, aggregate enrollments have not yet actually declined, although a reduction has occurred in the rate of increase. Some institutions, however, have already been forced to close due to insufficient enrollments, whether unionized or not; others have been forced to reduce programs and staff. Unions are far better established in the industrial sector, but even there they have not been able to protect members' jobs when companies have ceased operation. It has been estimated that several hundred colleges and universities will close during the 1980s, and it is doubtful that a union can preserve jobs at institutions that no longer exist or that no longer possess sufficient funds to maintain large teaching staffs. In the short run, a union might delay a closure or manage, by influencing political decisions regarding budget cuts, to prevent temporarily the termination of faculty, but in the longer run, closures are virtually inevitable given the demographic trends and associated economic conditions.

Collective bargaining has not dealt effectively with the

issues of budget cuts, faculty surpluses, and job security, and is unlikely to do so in the future. In higher education, then, the benefits from unionization are more hoped for than real.

There are two types of costs associated with collective bargaining at institutions of higher education: pecuniary, or out-of-pocket, costs, which are paid by individuals and their institutions, and the more difficult to measure nonpecuniary costs — which arise from changes in the institutional structure and in the education process.

For the individual faculty member, pecuniary costs include dues, fines, fees, and assessments paid to the union in addition to the foregone income due to strikes. Faculty union dues range as high as one percent of salaries.[11] There is little information available on other direct costs to individual faculty arising from unionization. From the point of view of the institution itself, collective bargaining is an expensive proposition, because additional staff is required to aid in contract administration and grievance proceedings. Legal counsel, labor relations experts, mediators, and fact-finders are required. As an example of the cost of administering and negotiating grievances, Rutgers University, during 1970-1975, processed 70 cases which were estimated to cost as much as $50,000 per case.[12] Thus, during this period, approximately $3.5 million expended for processing grievances were not available for education programs and salaries.

With regard to nonpecuniary costs, collective bargaining causes major institutional changes in the structure and process of decisionmaking. Collective bargaining introduces a new ingredient (the union) to institutional governance which often supplants the prerogatives of such traditional bodies as faculty senates. The entire administrative process becomes more complex, for the restrictions of the union contract must be incorporated into internal operating proce-

[11] See Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service (1974, p. 6).

[12] According to Begin (1978, p. 308), "Estimates on the cost per case range from $20,000 to $50,000, depending on whether negotiating time is included."

dures. Major shifts must occur in the relationship between the faculty and the administration. For example, if the department chairman is considered an administrator and, therefore, not a member of the union, a faculty member should consult the union representative prior to consultation with the department chairman. A strong case can then be made that there is less freedom under collective bargaining for the individual faculty member.

The introduction of collective bargaining can have an impact also on the rewards received by individual faculty for scholarly merit. Standardization of pay increases is a major goal of unions. This policy could eliminate or substantially reduce incentives for outstanding research and university service. If rewards are more tenuously related to performance, lower standards of performance could be adopted by faculty who remain at the institution, while outstanding faculty seek other appointments where their contributions are rewarded. Further, standardized starting salaries may make it difficult to attract the most highly qualified personnel. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975, p. 224) contend that standardization of pay and increased bureaucratization due to collective bargaining will lead to a decline in educational quality.

> The obvious danger is that personnel decisions that depend on subjective, subtle, and nonquantifiable academic judgment will be harder and harder to make. This means that merit may be sacrificed to egalitarianism. Where the discretion of peer judgement is curtailed by increased bureaucratization, status differences among faculty related to rank, publications, degrees, and experience will be reduced.

The same authors conducted a survey of college presidents which offered the statement, "Where it occurs, faculty collective bargaining will help improve the quality of educational services on campus." Virtually all respondents (96 percent of presidents at nonunion institutions and 93 percent of presidents at unionized institutions) disagreed with this statement.

Because the collective bargaining contract specifies in detail the relationship between the faculty and the administration, the union plays a major part in the decisionmaking process. Therefore, the union may determine priorities on educational programs and the allocation of institutional resources. A study by Channing, Steiner, and Timmerman (1973) indicates that a majority of the trustees of unionized community colleges believed that institutional change had been retarded. Before new programs could be instituted, the union had to be consulted and contract provisions studied and negotiated.

The foregoing discussion of nonpecuniary costs of unionization indicates that collective bargaining produces increased bureaucratization, reduces the incentives for professional excellence, may lead to a deterioration in educational quality, and permits the union to exercise at least some authority traditionally held by faculty in making decisions regarding the use of institutional resources and educational programs. Given these powers vested in the union by the collective bargaining agreement, there is, for the individual faculty member, an implicit limitation on academic freedom. A professor would find it imprudent to advocate ideas at variance with faculty union policy.

Under certain circumstances, individual faculty, even tenured faculty, have no choice but to support the union financially as a condition of employment. In states which do not have right-to-work laws, the payment of dues to the union may be required in order to maintain one's job. Union security agreements, therefore, can deny professors the right of freedom of choice.[13] By law, the union must represent all members of the bargaining unit, and an individual faculty member is prohibited from negotiating for himself. Forced

[13] The term, "right-to-work," generally is used solely in the context of the private sector. Many states which do not have right-to-work laws have provisions that prohibiit compulsory unionism for public employees. Overall, faculty at private institutions of higher education will be more subject to forced unionism than those employed at public colleges and universities. On unionism and public employees, see Baird (1978).

unionism implies that a faculty member owes his job to his financial support of the union, whether or not he approves of the actions of the collective bargaining agent. There is no recourse other than to forfeit one's appointment.

In sum, although collective bargaining may appear to be an alternative method of ensuring job security and economic gains during periods of declining enrollments and financial hardship in higher education, there is no convincing evidence that unionization has produced significant benefits for college faculties even in periods of relative prosperity. Although evidence indicates that benefits are negligible, the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs are substantial. Collective bargaining is a costly institution which diverts educational resources to contract negotiation and dispute settlement. Unionization creates additional bureaucracies and red tape, alters the traditional relationships between faculty and administration, and weakens the role of faculty in institutional decision-making. The union's emphasis on egalitarianism may reduce incentives for professional achievement and educational quality. Under certain conditions, individual faculty can be forced to support the union financially as a condition of employment. In a sense, professors owe their appointment to the union regardless of their tenure status or professional achievements. Given the power of union officials in the policymaking process, there is an implicit threat to academic freedom.

If the average salary of faculty members were $20,000 per year and union dues were one percent of salary, then unionization of all 540 thousand faculty would yield union revenues of $108 million annually from this source alone. Although faculty have little to gain and much to lose from collective bargaining, the unionization of higher education would obviously produce a bonanza for the unions themselves.

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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND FORCED UNIONISM?

James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson

In contrast to the rapid growth in enrollments and federal funding of higher education in the 1960s and early 1970s, the coming decade portends a prolonged period of financial exigency and retrenchment due to declining enrollments and other economic factors. Hundreds of colleges and universities are expected to close.

The effects of demographic and economic trends will seriously affect the economic status and job security of faculty. As declining enrollments reduce demand for instructional staff, the supply of academic job-seekers is projected to increase. Under these conditions, tenure, the traditional form of job security, may not be effective, and alternative arrangements may be sought.

Collective bargaining may appear to offer the best prospects to faculty for improved economic status and security. Because collective bargaining could appeal to college faculty whose jobs seem threatened, it is important to evaluate the benefits and costs of unions in higher education.

Studies of union/nonunion compensation differentials provide no convincing evidence that unions have succeeded in raising the compensation of unionized faculty relative to their nonunion counterparts. If collective bargaining has not produced substantial gains in periods of relative prosperity, there is little basis to suppose that unions will be successful in periods of retrenchment and economic adversity. Certainly, unions cannot reverse demographic trends or preserve jobs at institutions which close due to diminished enrollments.

Although the benefits from collective bargaining are illusory, the associated costs are real. Faculty members must pay dues, fines, fees, and assessments to support the organization's activities. Contract negotiation, grievance proceedings, and fact-finding are costly undertakings, which divert substantial resources from education programs and salaries. Collective bargaining alters the structure of campus governance as the union assumes authority previously vested in traditional bodies such as faculty senates; there is less freedom for the individual faculty member. Standardization of pay increases, a major goal of unions, reduces the rewards for outstanding performance and can lead to a decline in educational quality. Because the union assumes an important role in the decisionmaking at the institution, there is also an implicit limitation on academic freedom. Tenure may offer no protection, for union security agreements may require all faculty financially to support the union or forfeit their appointments.

The beneficiary of collective bargaining in higher education is the union; academic freedom and educational quality will inevitably suffer.

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